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Abstract 
Since 2005, jobless employable individuals have to be available for the labour mar-
ket with various activation programmes helping them. One major programme is 
short-term training teaching certain skills or assisting in job search. However, little is 
known about the effectiveness of such a short programme for welfare recipients. 
This study evaluates the effects of seven short-term training types in the introduction 
period of the reform in spring 2005 on the individual probability of being regularly 
employed. I use large German administrative datasets and propensity score match-
ing. The results show that within-company training has large positive effects. Fur-
thermore, skill training is more effective than other types. However, comparing skill 
training participants pair-wise with others does not result in consistent positive ef-
fects. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Seit 2005 müssen arbeitslose erwerbsfähige Hilfebedürftige dem Arbeitsmarkt zur 
Verfügung stehen. Aktivierungsmaßnahmen sollen sie hierbei unterstützen. Zahlen-
mäßig bedeutsam sind die kurzen Eignungsfeststellungs- und Trainingsmaßnah-
men, die verschiedene Qualifikationen vermitteln oder beim Bewerbungsprozess un-
terstützen sollen. Es ist jedoch nur wenig über die Wirksamkeit solch kurzer Maß-
nahmen für Arbeitslosengeld-II-Empfänger bekannt. Diese Arbeit evaluiert die Effek-
te von sieben Trainingsmaßnahmearten in der Einführungsperiode einschneidender 
Arbeitsmarktreformen Anfang 2005 auf die individuelle Beschäftigungswahrschein-
lichkeit der Teilnehmer. Es werden dazu administrative Daten und Propensity Score 
Matching verwendet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass betriebliche Trainingsmaßnah-
men starke positive Effekte haben. Außerdem ist Kenntnisvermittlung wirksamer als 
andere Arten von Training. Dennoch können die direkten Vergleiche von Kenntnis-
vermittlung mit anderen Maßnahmetypen nicht konsistente positive Effekte zeigen. 
 
JEL classification: C13, I38, J24, J68 
 
Keywords: welfare benefit, activation, training, evaluation, propensity score  
matching 
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1 Introduction 
Facing high unemployment - and especially high rates of long-term unemployment - 
the activation of unemployed people is a political task with high priority in Germany. 
One fundamental reform has been introduced in 2005 when a new benefit system 
for welfare recipients and long-term unemployed has been introduced. Since Janu-
ary 2005, all jobless people who are capable of working have to be available for the 
labour market. A variety of active labour market programmes should help them find 
a job or increase employability. One major programme is short-term training that 
lasts from a few days up to twelve weeks, which should help the unemployed learn 
certain skills or assist them in job search in short courses or short firm internships. 
This programme is characterised by a yearly inflow of more than 400,000 welfare 
recipients. This figure is noticeable given that the number of registered unemployed 
welfare benefit recipients ranges from 2.4 to 2.2 million from 2005 to 2007.1 
There is international evidence on the effects of likewise programmes mostly for 
unemployment insurance recipients. Evidence on programme effects for means-
tested benefit recipients is internationally scarce (Fromm/Sproß 2008). On the one 
hand, there is research on mainly individual job search assistance for unemploy-
ment insurance recipients (e.g. Centeno et al. 2008; Crépon et al. 2005; Dolton/ 
O'Neill 2002; Weber/Hofer 2003). On the other hand, there are also studies on 
longer training programmes and basic courses in other countries (e.g., Andrén/ 
Andrén 2002; Prey 1999). Most studies report positive programme effects on the 
individual employment probability. However, there is almost no study that specifi-
cally concentrates on such short programmes for welfare recipients and long-term 
unemployed. Only two German studies analyse the programme for welfare benefit 
recipients but both do not take programme heterogeneity into account (Huber et al. 
2009; Wolff/Jozwiak 2007). 
A lot is known about the impact of such policies on unemployed persons in general. 
However, little is known about the effectiveness for welfare recipients and long-term 
unemployed who live in poor households. Is it plausible that such a short pro-
gramme works for those persons who have not worked for a long time period? 
Furthermore, short-term training is a heterogeneous instrument and can have vari-
ous characteristics and aims. On the one hand, short-term training is designed to 
improve human capital in short courses that are carried out either in classrooms or 
within firms. On the other hand, it is used to test the willingness to work of unem-
ployed people. Besides, different types of qualifications can be acquired or im-
                                                
1  Source: Department of Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, calculations from 
the Data Ware House. The mentioned statistics as well as all data and figures in this 
study exclude the 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of administering 
the UB II, for which such information is not systematically available in the period just after 
the reform. According to estimates of the Federal Employment Agency around 13 percent 
of the unemployed are cared for in these 69 districts. There are no data available for the 
amount of programme participations in 2005. 
proved, e.g., application training, computer courses or profession specific skills. 
Training courses are also applied as aptitude tests for certain occupations and jobs 
or retraining measures. However, despite this variety of training types, only little is 
known on the functioning and effectiveness of various sub-programmes. As the 
treatment is different and not homogeneous, differing or even conflicting outcomes 
could emerge while considering sub-programmes of short-term training. Therefore, 
the evaluation of such a diverse programme should take the issues of programme 
heterogeneity into account  
This study is the first to deal with a variety of heterogeneous effects of short-term 
training and therefore evaluates the effects of seven short-term training types for 
welfare benefit recipients. The following sub-programmes are evaluated separately: 
application training, work tests, aptitude tests, skill training courses, combinations 
within classrooms, and aptitude tests, skill training/combinations within firms. I esti-
mate the impact of these seven types of short-term training on the individual prob-
ability of being employed in a regular unsubsidised job without receiving additional 
benefits. Moreover, I evaluate the effect of these training programmes on the prob-
ability of getting a stable job after participation. 
The estimation method is propensity score matching, which is one widely used esti-
mator to identify causal treatment effects. Various matching algorithms as well as 
sensitivity analyses are applied in order to establish the robustness of the estimation 
results. This study does not only rely on large samples of several rich administrative 
data sets. In contrast to most micro-econometric evaluation studies also detailed 
information on partners and other household members are available. Therefore, 
partner characteristics can be taken into account as they may influence the selec-
tion into the programme as well as the outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: First, the institutional setting of the new 
law and the various short-term training programmes are explained. This is followed 
by theoretical expectations of the effects of different short-term training pro-
grammes. Then, the literature on training and heterogeneity of training is displayed. 
Furthermore, data, samples, the estimation strategy and the implementation are 
explained. Finally, the results are followed by the conclusion. All tables and figures 
are displayed in the Appendix. 
2 Institutional setting 
Due to persistently high unemployment in recent years a large number of labour 
market reforms have been implemented in Germany since 2002. The most funda-
mental reform has been introduced in January 2005. The Social Code II, a new legal 
setting on means-tested benefit receipt, was established. A new benefit system has 
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been introduced where needy people who are able to work2 are assigned to a new 
welfare benefit, the unemployment benefit II (UB II). It is designed for those unem-
ployed who are not eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) or ran out of their UI 
eligibility. This benefit replaces the former unemployment aid and social assistance. 
Hence, since 2005, there are two types of unemployment benefit. 
As former social assistance recipients have not been automatically available for the 
labour market, there are a lot of changes for them now: They have to look for a job 
and take part in active labour market programmes. If they do not comply, they will 
face financial sanctions. Therefore, there is a completely new group who appeared 
in the labour agencies and on the labour market. UB II is means-tested; hence its 
level depends on income and assets of all members of the needy household. Such 
a household consists of at least one needy working age unemployed person who is 
able to work. Other people living in the same household may belong to the needy 
household, but not necessary all of them do. The partner and children under the age 
of 25 years belong to the needy household. If the needy employable member is 
younger than 18 years and not married, also the parents and/or the partner of a par-
ent may belong to the needy household. 
The new welfare benefit UB II consists of a base benefit, that is currently 359 Euro; 
additionally, costs of housing and heating are covered (Wolff/Jozwiak 2007). Fur-
thermore, additional expenses, e.g., for pregnant women, are additionally covered 
with a lump sum. 
With the introduction of UB II, new forms of active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
have been introduced. Moreover, UB II recipients can participate in various pro-
grammes that have existed before and are also still available for UI recipients. We 
can distinguish a large bundle of different ALMPs that aim to help unemployed peo-
ple to reintegrate into the regular labour market. First, there are programmes en-
hancing qualifications and accumulate human capital such as training programmes. 
Second, there are public employment programmes such as job creation schemes or 
work opportunities. Third, there are subsidised jobs with wage subsidies either for 
employers or employees. Fourth, there are programmes promoting self-employ-
ment. Finally, there are programmes where counselling and/or the placing service is 
contracted out to private agencies (OECD 1993). 
Short-term training programmes ("Eignungsfeststellungs- und Trainingsmaßnah-
men") are an important scheme of German ALMP. Its yearly costs amount to ap-
proximately 160 Million Euro from 2005 on. This is considerably less than for other 
programmes, such as One-Euro-Jobs, also because of the short duration (Bernhard 
et al. 2009). 
                                                
2  People who can work under the usual labour market conditions for at least three hours a 
day are considered as capable of working or employable. Only due to an illness or dis-
ability it is possible not to fulfil this criterion (Article 8, Social Code II). 
The overall aim of short-term training is to help unemployed people to reintegrate 
directly or indirectly into the regular labour market. However, short-term training is a 
heterogeneous instrument. First, skill training courses are assigned to integrate par-
ticipants directly into regular employment. Furthermore, aptitude tests are either 
assigned to test for the abilities to participate in other programmes, e.g., a wage 
subsidy, or are assigned to integrate directly into the regular labour market. A third 
course type is application training which should improve the search process and the 
search effectiveness in order to reintegrate into employment. However, this kind of 
short-term training is also often used as test of willingness to work. A small propor-
tion of courses provides founders of start-ups with the necessary knowledge on 
starting a business. The shortest courses are application training courses and work 
tests which only last a couple of days up to two weeks. Aptitude tests lasts up to 
four weeks and skill training courses have a duration of up to eight weeks. If a 
course is offered in combination with another course type it can last a maximum of 
twelve weeks. Then, mostly aptitude tests and skill training are combined. Kurtz 
(2003, 2004) reports that the most frequent aim of short-term training is the integra-
tion into the regular labour market. However, other aims such as integration into 
other labour market programmes or work tests are also applied in practice. Short-
term training programmes can be either carried out in classrooms or within compa-
nies as internships. 
During the programme participants continue their UB II receipt, however they do not 
receive any additional wage. Only programme costs, travel expenses and costs for 
child care are covered. While participating in a short-term training programme, par-
ticipants are still registered as job-seekers; though they are no longer registered as 
unemployed. 
The heterogeneity of short-term training programmes has hindered programme 
evaluations in the past (Blaschke/Plath 2002; Kurtz 2004). As the treatment is dif-
ferent and not homogeneous, differing or even conflicting outcomes could emerge 
while considering sub-programmes of short-term training. Therefore, the evaluation 
of such a diverse programme should take the issues of programme heterogeneity 
into account (Caliendo 2005; Heckman et al. 1999). This study analyses the effects 
of seven types of short-term training. 
3 Potential effects of short-term training programmes 
Although short-term training is heterogeneous and pursues different aims or  secon-
dary aims (Blaschke/Plath 2002), integration into the regular labour market is most 
important as it enables participants to reduce their dependence on benefit receipt 
and ends their neediness in the long term (Achatz et al. 2009). Furthermore, all sec-
ondary aims, e.g. increased employability or the verification of skills, lead to the 
main aim of labour market integration. 
Therefore, several effects of short-term training can be expected theoretically (Calm-
fors 1994). First, some short-term training programmes are designed to test the will-
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ingness to work of UB II recipients. This kind of programme could lead to threat ef-
fects in that sense that unemployed who do not want to participate and therefore 
leave unemployment, e.g., by legalising illegal employment. However, this effect is 
an ex ante effect and is not considered in this study because of the lack of required 
data. 
Other effects that are theoretically expected are ex post effects. Most evaluation 
studies find locking-in effects. During their programme participation, participants 
reduce their search intensity. I expect locking-in effects to be small and of minor 
importance as short-term training programmes have a maximum duration of twelve 
weeks. Moreover, in the case of application training courses locking-in effects 
should not even be apparent or especially small. Participants should improve the 
search effectiveness and are supposed to write applications during their application 
training course. 
However, the most important effect, which is expected, is an employment effect. It 
can be reached through different channels, and therefore through different specific 
sub-programmes. The theoretical discussion can be embedded in a standard search 
model (Mortensen 1986). Such a model explains job search behaviour of unem-
ployed people and specifies job search as a process until finding a suitable job. The 
job finding probability of a job-seeker can be influenced by altering the probability of 
getting a job offer and the probability of accepting it. Job-seekers choose a strategy 
that maximizes their expected life-time income. Therefore, short-term training pro-
grammes should raise the reemployment opportunities of participants compared to 
non-participants through different possible channels. 
First, an employment effect can be reached through human capital improvement. 
Skill training courses, aptitude tests or combinations aim at enhancing general or 
specific human capital. Enhanced qualifications should imply better job finding 
chances especially for unemployed people who lack some important skills. Most of 
the courses that take place in classrooms provide general human capital. Most of 
those sub-programmes within companies provide general as well as firm or sector 
specific human capital. Second, an employment effect can be reached through the 
improvement of search abilities as well. Such abilities are taught in application train-
ing courses or work tests. Therefore, application training should shorten the search 
process because it conveys a more efficient search pattern, provides counselling in 
job search, and improves the motivation of participants. Third, the provision of in-
formation is another channel that could lead to an employment effect. Participants of 
most classroom short-term training programmes are provided with information, e.g., 
on the regional labour market. This information could help to optimise the search 
process or alter the likelihood to accept a job. Also within-company training provides 
participants with firm- or sector specific information which helps to find a job. A 
fourth channel is the signalling through certificates. This should especially be the 
case for classroom skill training courses or combinations where participants get cer-
tificates needed for certain occupations or jobs, such as the forklift certificate. Fifth, 
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aptitude tests in classrooms or within firms test someone's ability and suitability for 
other ALMPs or activities which should lead to regular labour market integration 
later.  Sixth, within-company training programmes moreover provide the participant 
with a contact to a potential employer which should help the intern to establish him-
self on the regular labour market. Finally, programme participation could also lead to 
stigmatisation. However, this should be of minor importance as short-term training 
programmes are quite short and not especially designed for unemployed who are 
hard to place or who have special difficulties on the labour market such as, e.g., job 
creation schemes. 
Furthermore, there are unwanted indirect effects that may appear and are men-
tioned in the literature (Calmfors 1994). These are deadweight losses, substitution 
effects, and direct displacement effects. Deadweight losses arise when firms hire 
participants that they would have hired anyway also in absence of the programme. 
Such effects are more likely to occur in the case of job creation schemes (Calmfors 
1994), but they could also occur in the case of within-company training programmes. 
Substitution effects appear when one worker is replaced by a programme participant 
because of a change in relative wage costs. This effect is not likely for short-term 
training programmes because the programme only lasts for a maximum of a few 
weeks. Moreover, active labour market programmes could crowd out regular em-
ployment and lead to a direct displacement effect. That means that the number of 
jobs may be reduced elsewhere because the competition may be influenced through 
subsidised employment. All these effects are unintended but may appear while the 
latter two are less likely in this case. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
detect such effects. 
To sum up, I expect positive effects for the sub-programmes of short-term training. 
However, I presume that ex post effects for work tests are rather zero as this sub-
programme is not primarily designed to improve after programme employment out-
comes but to test ones willingness to work in general. Moreover, I expect sub-
programmes where an employment effect can be reached through more than one 
channel, such as classroom skill training courses, classroom combinations and both 
types of within-company training, to be more effective than application training or 
aptitude tests. 
4 Training effects and heterogeneity of training in the  
literature 
There are international studies on the effects of two types of likewise programmes, 
one is job search assistance (JSA), and training programmes are the other type. As 
German short-term training programmes are very heterogeneous there are several 
different programmes that are partly comparable to the sub-programmes. However, 
not all studies can be compared easily to German programme types. First, most 
studies on JSA analyse individual counselling or job coaching. However, this is 
more comparable to another German programme "contracting out". Second, in other 
countries, training programmes mostly last longer than twelve weeks and are some-
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times more comparable to the longer German training programmes. Card et al. 
(2009) show with their meta analysis that job search assistance as well as class-
room and on-the-job training have positive effects in a large bundle of international 
studies. 
Most international studies on individual job search assistance report positive effects 
on different outcome variables. Dolton/O'Neill (2002) and Graversen/van Ours 
(2006) use experimental data. The former detect positive effects for males on the 
unemployment rate while the latter find a 30 percent higher job finding rate driven by 
more intensive contacts. Others use administrative data from different countries. 
While Crépon et al. (2005) find positive programme effects that unemployment re-
currence is lower with duration models, Centeno et al. (2008) use difference-in-
difference models and matching and state only small positive programme effects 
given the after-programme unemployment duration, mostly for males and better 
educated individuals. Women benefited less. Weber/Hofer (2004) use the timing-of-
events approach and also detect positive programme effects of Austrian JSA, 
measuring the success with the individual unemployment duration. Van den Berg/ 
van der Klaauw (2006) use administrative as well as survey data. They apply dura-
tion models and find that low-intensity job search assistance programmes have no 
or only small effects. On the contrary, high-intensive assistance programmes have a 
more positive effect on the exit rate to work. Dahlberg et al. (2009) find positive em-
ployment effects for social assistance recipients of Swedish activation programmes. 
In contrast to these studies, Geerdsen/Holm (2007), Graversen/van Ours (2008) and 
Rosholm/Svarer (2008) examine threat effects and therefore ex ante effects of JSA. 
They use Danish experimental data and are able to detect threat effects. Only Grav-
ersen/van Ours (2008) cannot confirm such effects for the long-term unemployed. 
Büttner (2008) uses German experimental data to analyse threat effects of aptitude 
tests besides programme effects for UI recipients. He concludes that the threat ef-
fect is larger than the programme effect itself comparing the outflows out of unem-
ployment for part-time unemployed women and young adults under 27 years. 
Other studies deal with classroom training programmes in general. Examples are 
studies that survey different studies on training programmes. Friedlander et al. 
(1997) survey training programmes for the economically disadvantaged in the US. 
They demonstrate that most studies find positive earnings effects of voluntary as 
well as mandatory training programmes, especially for women. Calmfors et al. 
(2002) report positive effects on regular employment in most studies with a few ex-
ceptions without significant results or even negative effects. The study from Andrén/ 
Andrén (2002) is another example and is concerned with training programmes in 
Sweden. They find positive employment effects. Moreover, Prey (1999) deals with 
different basic courses in St. Gallen/Switzerland. This measure seems to be more 
comparable to German short-term training. She finds evidence for positive effects on 
the employment status of German language classes with the help of propensity 
score matching, whereas she cannot state any effect for computer lessons. 
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Furthermore, some authors analyse and compare different measures including train-
ing programmes. Most of them compare programme effects directly to the effects of 
another programme. However, Leetma/Vörk (2003) analyse three different pro-
grammes separately with survey data and propensity score matching and state posi-
tive effects of training on the employment probability as well as on the wage. Dahl/ 
Lorentzen (2005) do not compare training directly to employment programmes be-
cause participants are too different to be comparable. They detect positive earnings 
effects of training for social assistance recipients with propensity score matching. 
Kluve et al. (2008) find positive employment effects for training compared to inter-
vention works with difference-in-difference matching procedures. On the contrary, 
Bolvig et al. (2003) use competing risk models and state detrimental effects on the 
welfare exit rate of training programmes. Weber/Hofer (2003) compare active job-
search programmes and formal training. They find positive effects for active job-
search and negative effects for training for the exit out of unemployment. Only for 
women, they find small positive effects for training. Also Fredriksson/Johansson 
(2003) find negative effects of training participation on the outflow to employment. 
Sianesi (2008) states generally negative employment effects of training programmes 
with propensity score matching. Only if training is compared to work practice, there 
are small positive effects. Moreover, Gerfin/Lechner (2002) analyse basic courses, 
computer courses and language courses and find negative effects on the outflow of 
unemployment. 
While it is shown that a lot of studies show positive effects of different training pro-
grammes on the labour market performance of participants, some find negative ef-
fects. However, there are also some studies that concentrate on the heterogeneity 
of programmes and analyse sub-programmes of one programme. Examples are 
evaluations of sub-programmes of the US welfare-to-work programme (Dyke et al. 
2006; Hotz et al. 2006) or different programmes of the British "New Deal" (Blundell 
et al. 2004). Another German example is Caliendo (2005) who analyses job creation 
schemes in Germany that take place in different sectors of the economy also differ-
entiating the promotion type as well as different programme providers. These au-
thors emphasise the importance of distinguishing between sub-programmes in an 
evaluation if the programme is heterogeneous. 
Moreover, there are several studies that analyse the heterogeneity of German fur-
ther training programmes. In contrast to short-term training, this is a longer pro-
gramme (up to three years) mostly with direct reference to an occupation or job. 
Each study takes different samples from administrative data during the years 1986 
to 2002 into account. 
Kluve et al. (2007) use the generalized propensity score, i.e. a dose-response func-
tion. They find an increasing dose-response function for training programmes up to 
100 days. Longer programmes do not lead to an increase in treatment effect. The 
other studies use propensity score matching. Biewen et al. (2007) compare different 
further training programmes and short-term training. They find that short training 
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participants would not have been better off in longer training programmes. However, 
this is not the case for practically oriented further training, which is superior to the 
other training programmes. Lechner et al. (2005) state the largest effects for retrain-
ing in the long-run. Yet, comparing different programmes directly, shorter pro-
grammes up to six months outperform longer programmes because of shorter lock-
ing-in effects. Fitzenberger et al. (2006) find locking-in effects of further training, but 
positive effects in the long-run. They detect weak evidence that programmes provid-
ing specific professional skills and practice firms outperform the longer retraining 
programme. 
In addition, there are some studies that are concerned with programme heterogene-
ity of German short-term training programmes. All of them use administrative data 
and propensity score matching but analyse different time periods and target groups 
than this study does. 
Stephan et al. (2006) distinguish three alternatives of short-term training, skill train-
ing courses within companies and in classrooms as well as work tests. They only 
find positive effects for men in skill training courses within companies on the prob-
ability of leaving unemployment. Stephan (2008) and Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) differen-
tiate between short classroom and within-company training courses. Stephan (2008) 
reports substantial positive employment effects for within-company training. This is 
in line with Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) who find positive employment effects for both pro-
gramme types, but substantially larger effects for within-firm training for UB II recipi-
ents. While within company training raises the employment probability for partici-
pants compared to non-participation by around 15 percentage points it is only about 
three percentage points for classroom training. 
Two studies that analyse different training programmes also compare different short-
term training programmes directly in a pair-wise comparison. Stephan/Pahnke 
(2008) compares classroom and within-company training. The latter clearly outper-
forms classroom training showing positive regular employment effects in the direct 
comparison. Wunsch/Lechner (2008) analyse three types of short-term training. 
They state zero effects for unsubsidised employment integration for short combined 
measures as well as short training. Jobseeker assessment even has negative ef-
fects on the regular employment rate. 
Most studies concentrate on treatment effects for unemployment insurance recipi-
ents. Only few international papers concentrate on target groups such as welfare 
recipients for training or activation programmes (Dahl/Lorentzen 2005; Dahlberg et 
al. 2009; Giertz 2004). Fromm/Sproß (2008) give an overview of the international 
studies emphasising on programme effects for welfare recipients and show that 
most of the few existing studies do not evaluate treatment effects. There are only 
two German studies that analyses short-term training for welfare recipients (Huber 
et al. 2009; Wolff/Jozwiak 2007), while Huber et al. (2009) do not differentiate differ-
ent training programmes. 
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Furthermore, there is a lack of studies that analyse the heterogeneity of short train-
ing programmes. While there is a variety of sub-programmes, only two to three sub-
programmes are differentiated. 
This is the first evaluation study that distinguishes and compares seven homogene-
ous sub-programmes of short-term training. Moreover, such a detailed evaluation 
has also not yet been issued for the target group of welfare benefit UB II recipients. 
Therefore, this study adds to the literature of programme heterogeneity and the ef-
fects of activation programmes for welfare recipients. 
5 Data and samples 
The data in use are constructed from different administrative data sources of the 
German Federal Employment Agency. I use samples of the "Integrated Employment 
Biographies" (IEB) and information from a new administrative dataset, the "Unem-
ployment Benefit II Receipt History" ("Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung", LHG). 
Moreover, for the outcome variables, additional information on contributory employ-
ment from an additional data set, the so-called "Verbleibsnachweise" is used in or-
der to extend the observation window. 
The use of data that are rich in terms of information on all variables potentially influ-
encing the selection process as well as the outcome is crucial in non-experimental 
studies. These data give the opportunity to take more important variables into ac-
count than most German evaluation studies, i.e. not only individual characteristics 
but also partner and household characteristics. 
Following Heckman et al. (1999) the choice of outcome variables is important for 
evaluating treatment effects. The aim of short-term training programmes is to inte-
grate participants directly or indirectly, e.g., through further programme participa-
tions, into the regular labour market. Therefore, I use "regular unsubsidised em-
ployment" as the primary outcome indicator. This indicator is computed for the first 
(calendar) day of the months and is computed up to 28 months after the programme 
started. Furthermore, outcome indicators on job stability are included. One is the 
number of months in regular unsubsidised employment in the first six, twelve and 28 
months. Another indicator is the employment stability of the first regular job. This is 
measured by two variables, one indicating the first regular job lasted at least six 
months and another indicating the first regular job lasted at least twelve months. 
There is only a 28 months time window for regular employment after programme 
start. Thus, in order to observe an uninterrupted employment duration of at least 
twelve months, only employment spells are considered that started in the first 17 
months after programme start.3 
                                                
3  Also other indicators without that exclusion restriction have been used, and the results 
aim in the same direction. 
The samples consist of participants in seven sub-programmes and a non-participa-
tion or waiting group who does not participate in the programme in a given time-
frame. The group of participants is the total inflow into short-term training pro-
grammes from February to April 2005 of individuals who were both registered un-
employed and recipients of the welfare benefit UB II on 31st of January 2005. Since 
older UB II recipients do nearly never enter short-term training programmes in the 
observation period, only individuals between 15 to 57 years are considered. 
The group of non-participants (waiting group) stems from a 20 percent random 
sample of unemployed UB II recipients on the 31st of January 2005 and who did not 
enter any short-term training programme from February to April 2005. This group is 
called the waiting group as they could start a short-term training programme at a 
later point in time. 
The sample sizes of the different groups and sub-programmes are available in Ta-
ble 1. There are 66,000 participants in the different sub-programmes, and more than 
400,000 individuals in the waiting group. Aptitude tests, skill training courses and 
combinations are more common classroom training programmes. Application train-
ing and work tests are more prevalent in Western Germany. Within-company train-
ing programmes are mostly aptitude tests. As short-term training programmes are 
heterogeneous with respect to their design and their aims, I am especially con-
cerned with programme heterogeneity and distinguish between seven sub-
programmes. 
6 Methodology 
Estimation Strategy 
I investigate the effect of seven different short-term training programmes: application 
training, work tests, aptitude tests, skill training courses, combinations within class-
rooms, and aptitude tests, skill training/combinations within firms. 
Evaluating the effects of these programmes, the problem of non-observable possible 
outcomes arises. Every individual can potentially be in two states, participation in or 
the other sub-programme, with a possibly different outcome. As no individual can be 
observed in two states at the same time, there is always a non-observed state or a 
counterfactual. The potential outcome model introduced by, e.g., Roy (1951) and 
Rubin (1974) gives a standard framework for this problem. Based on this basic 
model, Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) came up with an extension of this model 
for multiple states, which fits better to the case of analysing seven sub-programmes. 
Let D be an indicator for the assignment to a specific treatment starting at time t, 
. A value of 0 means non-participation at t in any of the programmes, 
which means waiting. In the general case N instead of seven treatments are possi-
ble.  is the potential outcome of treatment s at time t+x. The assignment hap-
pens in t (in this case from February to April 2005), and the outcome is measured 
every month after the treatment started. 
}7,...,1,0{∈tD
s
xtY +
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I am interested to assess the average effect for participants of participating in sub-
programme s compared to participating in a different sub-programme s'. 
)|()|()|( '' sDYEsDYEsDYYE ssssATT =−===−=τ  for  (1) '},7,...,1,0{', ssss ≠∈
While  is observed in the data,  is unobservable. This 
identification problem needs to be resolved and identifying assumptions have to be 
invoked. Under these assumptions, a comparison of the outcomes of participants in 
s with similar participants in s' identify the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). 
)|( sDYE s = )|( ' sDYE s =
First, the definition of potential outcomes implicitly assumes the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1980). That means that an individual's potential 
outcome only depends on his/her own participation and not on the treatment status 
of other individuals in the population. Also peer-effects and general equilibrium ef-
fects are ruled out by this assumption (Holland 1986). This assumption is unlikely to 
be invalidated if the programme scope is not too large (Frölich 2004), which should 
be the case evaluating seven sub-programmes. 
Second, the treatment has to satisfy some form of exogeneity and fulfil the so-called 
unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983). This assumption implies 
that systematic differences in the outcomes between similar participants in s and s' 
can be attributed to the programme. Conditional on the value of observable charac-
teristics X, the counterfactual average 'sY  for individuals joining sub-programme s is 
the same as the observed average 'sY  for those participating in sub-programme s': 
),'|(),|( '' xXsDYExXsDYE ss =====  for '  (2) },,...,1,0{', ssSss ≠∈
Methods such as matching generate a matched group from s' in which the distribu-
tion of observable pre-treatment characteristics X is similar to the distribution in 
group s.4  
Further requirements are the existence of a common support (weak version accord-
ing to Lechner 2000) as well as the overlap.  has to hold which 
means that persons with the same values of X must have a probability smaller than 
1 of participating in s as well as in s'. Furthermore, the distributions of the probabili-
ties for participants in s and for participants in s' 
 have to overlap. All participants in s' must have a comparable 
counterpart in group s. 
1)|( <= XsDP
)sD =,|( XsDP =
)',|( sDXsDP ==
In order to make the assumptions for the selection on observables plausible, rich 
data is needed. The set of covariates X should contain all the variables that affect 
                                                
4  The method depends on the research question and the available data (Heckman et al. 
1999). In the following, I argue why matching is useful in this context. 
the participation as well as the outcomes. Hence, I use several administrative data-
sets that provide a rich set of covariates: local labour market conditions, characteris-
tics of the job seeker and his/her partner, such as human capital or labour market 
characteristics and unemployment periods. Moreover, I have detailed knowledge on 
which factors influence the programme participation process as we conducted a 
survey asking case managers on the selection and assignment process of short-
term training programmes (Achatz et al. 2009). This information is used for the 
choice of variables in the selection equations. Unemployed individuals can ask for 
participation in programmes. However, it is up to the case worker to decide if one 
should participate. Moreover, it is more often the case for short-term training pro-
grammes that case workers propose a certain programme to the welfare recipients. 
A large proportion of case managers think that employment chances and also moti-
vation in general are important assignment criteria (Achatz et al. 2009). Therefore, I 
control for a set of variables characterising the individual's past employment history, 
e.g., job characteristics such as pre-unemployment wage or professional position, 
duration of last employment or the time since the last job. Furthermore, the health 
status and disabilities influence employment chances, and therefore they are taken 
into the models. Moreover, information on human capital, such as school and pro-
fessional education is included as this reflects future labour market chances, too. 
Additionally, I also rely on information on human capital and the employment history 
of the partner, which also reflects ones motivation. Such information on partners has 
not been taken into account in most evaluation studies in the past. Moreover, these 
variables are also supposed to affect outcomes, such as regular employment. 
Less case managers, but still a considerable number, think that German language 
competences or compatibility with family obligations are important selection issues. 
Therefore, I include information on the nationality and the migration background. 
Moreover, household information is taken into account. That means that there is 
information on the number of children and on the existence of a partner. Moreover, 
older individuals are less prone to participate in training programmes (Bernhard et 
al. 2006). Therefore, I use age as another important socio-demographic attribute. 
Local labour market conditions are a key variable to be controlled for (Heckman et 
al. 1997). Thus, I control for variables describing the local labour market situation on 
district level: the local unemployment rate, the percentage in long-term unemploy-
ment as well as the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Furthermore, I consider the trend 
of all variables, i.e. the total percentage change during the last year. Moreover, vari-
ables indicating a regional classification of twelve labour market types according to 
Rüb/Werner (2007) are included. 
Furthermore, unemployment duration plays an important role. Therefore, I include 
pre-programme unemployment duration when comparing individuals from two differ-
ent sub-programmes or the control group. Next, the participation decision could dif-
fer if individuals have participated in any ALMP before. Thus, the number of former 
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ALMP participation as well as type of the last ALMP are included. Moreover, not 
only unemployment duration is important in this special case. Having installed a new 
benefit system in January 2005, many individuals who have neither worked nor have 
been registered unemployed, e.g., formal social assistance recipients or individuals 
from the "hidden labour force" as the difference between the potential and the actual 
labour force, now receive the new welfare benefit UB II. This is the reason why I 
also take out-of-labour force periods into account. Most variables in use are shown 
in one example of the probit estimates for the largest analysed group in Table 2.5 
Summing up, conditioning on this huge set of important covariates for the assign-
ment and the outcome variables, the assignment should be unrelated to the out-
comes. That means that assignment is random conditioning on this rich set of ob-
servable covariates. 
On top of that, if one may still argue that there are unobserved factors remaining 
that influence the selection process and the outcomes. However, this study deals 
explicitly with the introduction period of a large reform. New public employment ser-
vices have been installed in January 2005 with a huge amount of new case workers 
and employees. A large number of new clients arrived who had not been available 
to public employment services before and also not yet registered. Therefore, the 
workload in this starting period has been especially high for case managers. That 
means that the selection into short-term training should have been closer to ran-
domness than in another period where a case manager is really able to choose a 
defined target group because of less time restrictions. 
Another reason why matching is especially suitable for this research question is that 
in general the analysis becomes more complex in the multi-treatment case com-
pared to the case with single treatments. Other identification strategies, such as the 
difference-in-difference and the instrumental variable approach, often only identify 
the effect of participation versus non-participation and in many cases do not allow a 
pair-wise comparison between different sub-programmes (Frölich 2004). Given the 
available data, propensity score matching is especially suitable here. 
Implementation 
One approach to identify effects of short-term training programmes is propensity 
score matching. Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) have shown for the binary treatment 
case that if the unconfoundedness assumption holds conditional on the covariates 
X, it also holds conditional on the propensity score p(X). According to this condition, 
observations with the same propensity score have the same distribution of observ-
ables; given pre-treatment characteristics, treatment is random and treatments and 
control units do on average not differ with respect to pre-treatment characteristics. 
The advantage of the propensity score is its feasibility because it avoids the curse of 
dimensionality if too many covariates play an important role. Lechner (2001) and 
                                                
5  A complete list of all covariates and descriptive results are available on request. 
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Sianesi (2008) show that these properties also hold for the multi-treatment case. 
One needs to find a p(X) such that the following holds: 
}',{),(| ssDXpXD ∈⊥  (3) 
It is shown that the multiple treatments can be ignored so far, because unemployed 
persons who do not participate in a considered programme are not needed for iden-
tification (Lechner 2001). Moreover, Lechner (2002) shows in an application that the 
estimation results are basically the same albeit deriving the conditional probabilities 
from a multinomial model or estimating pair-wise directly. 
I apply binary probit models for each pair-wise comparison to estimate the propen-
sity score p(X). I use appropriate sampling weights for the comparisons to the group 
of non-participants (waiting group) as this potential control group represents a 20 
percent random sample of the population whereas the treatment groups who partici-
pate in the sub-groups consist of the population of the treated. The covariate sets of 
the probit models are rich in terms of attributes and cover the relevant aspects de-
termining the programme selection process and the outcomes, as mentioned above. 
In order to choose the exact model in each case and take the variables into account 
that influence the selection into the treatment, first Wald tests are applied. There-
fore, the models may differ for the different sub-groups and pair-wise comparisons. 
Moreover, I assess the quality of matching as well as the common support region in 
order to decide for a specification of p(X) and a matching estimator. Different match-
ing algorithms are therefore applied.6 The final decision for one algorithm depended 
on the matching quality of the pair-wise comparison and can differ for each model. 
Moreover, I use analytic standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors would also 
be appropriate (Abadie/Imbens 2006) but it is shown that the asymptotic theory for 
 is reliable for a setting with samples from around 300 observations on and that 
bootstrapped and asymptotic standard errors agree (Heckman et al. 1998). This is 
also shown in other empirical applications (Gerfin/Lechner 2002, Lechner 2002). 
∧β
Furthermore, I consider participants' heterogeneity and analyse samples for men 
and women in Eastern and Western Germany separately. Reasons are different 
attitudes towards labour market participation as well as clearly different unemploy-
ment rates and therefore resulting integration chances. Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) esti-
mated short-term training effects for more groups but not for the detailed sub-
programmes, e.g., by age, household composition or unemployed persons who 
have not worked for a long time period. Such a variety of groups is ignored here, as 
this paper concentrates on the effects of heterogeneous short-term training pro-
grammes. 
                                                
6  I applied different nearest neighbour matching algorithms with and without oversampling 
as well as radius matching with different radius calipers. The results are robust when dif-
ferent algorithms are feasible. 
The outcome variables are measured every month after programme start. As there 
are no programme starts for those who are waiting and not yet participating in any 
short-term training programme during the months February to April 2005 I calculate 
random programme starts for the waiting group. The basis is the distribution of pro-
gramme starts for the months February, March and April for every sub-programme. 
The programme starts are generated differently for each sub-programme/waiting 
pair. 
Quality of Matching 
Relying on a rich set of covariates explaining the selection into short-term training 
programmes, there should be a comparable and very similar control group to the 
treatment group. This balancing of covariates after matching can be tested. There 
are several measures, such as joint significance and Pseudo-R², the mean stan-
dardised bias (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1985) and t-tests for differences in covariate av-
erages between the treatment and control group. The mean standardised bias of all 
the covariates before and after matching is displayed in Table 3 and 4. After the 
matching procedure, the mean standardised bias is substantially reduced. Using the 
waiting group as a control group, the bias after matching is reduced to below three 
percent in all samples, which is a fairly good reduction compared to other evaluation 
studies (Caliendo/Kopeinig 2008). Concerning the pair-wise comparisons, there are 
only a few cases where the mean standardised bias slightly exceeds three. Fur-
thermore, the balancing quality for nearly all single covariates shows that there is no 
significant difference between the means of treated and matched controls after try-
ing out several matching procedures. Moreover, the common support region is 
shown in Table 3 and 4. Only few cases in the treatment groups are not in the com-
mon support region. The amount of off support treated is always below 20 percent 
and in the most cases below ten percent. Therefore, the matching procedures find 
statistical twins for nearly all treatment individuals. 
Furthermore, we have to assume that both groups lie in a common support region. 
That means that the propensity score distributions of both groups overlap and the 
participation probabilities are lower than one. Figures 1 to 7 display the propensity 
score distribution of each sub-programme versus waiting. They show that the distri-
butions for control and treatment group are quite similar. This also holds for the pair-
wise comparisons that are not displayed here given the large number of compari-
sons. They are available on request. 
Moreover, the estimation of treatment effects with propensity score matching is 
based on the conditional independence assumption. If there are unobserved factors 
that affect treatment assignment and the outcome variable, a 'hidden bias' may 
arise. Rosenbaum bounds, a sensitivity test, help to determine how strongly an un-
observed variable must influence the assignment process to undermine the implica-
tions of the matching analysis. Unfortunately, Rosenbaum bounds are only imple-
mented as a Stata command for nearest neighbour matching with one nearest 
neighbour and without replacement (Becker/Caliendo 2007). As nearest neighbour 
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matching without replacement is not appropriate in this case and I rather use radius 
caliper matching, Rosenbaum bounds cannot be displayed here. 
7 Results 
What drives the selection? 
Case workers may place different unemployed to the different sub-programmes for 
several reasons, which may also influence the sub-programme effectiveness. Ta-
ble 6 shows the different employment rates for unmatched and matched individuals 
from the controls in the waiting group. The difference is especially apparent for both 
within-firm types, but also noticeable for skill training or combinations. 
Therefore, it is worth looking at the factors driving the selection into the sub-
programmes of short-term training. One example may be that harder to place indi-
viduals are placed more often in aptitude tests than in skill training courses. Some 
remarkable selection results are discussed here shortly. One example of the probit 
estimates for the largest estimation group (Western German men in within-firm apti-
tude tests) is displayed in Table 2.7 
It is considerable that young unemployed under the age of 25 have the highest 
probability to participate in each of the short-term training programme types com-
pared to the older age groups. But when comparing different sub-programmes, it 
turns out that individuals over the age of 25 participate with a higher likelihood in 
skill training than in application training or combinations. One reason may be longer 
unemployment periods from older unemployed individuals while younger unem-
ployed potentially recently finished their education and more search skills are essen-
tial and not certain job specific skills. 
In general, foreigners are not especially targeted with programmes (Hohmeyer/Kopf 
2009). It can be shown here that the classroom training combination, as the longest 
short-term training programme, is the only type where foreigners and migrants as a 
special target group have higher participation propensities than Germans. However, 
this is only the case for Eastern Germany where the percentage is remarkably lower 
than in the Western part. Also, persons with health impairments are not especially 
targeted by one of the different programme types.  
Most sub-programmes overrepresent persons with a relative high education. There 
are probably different predominantly longer and more intense programmes, such as 
One-Euro-Jobs, that are designed for lower educated unemployed. One exception is 
the use as a work test where education does not have any significant coefficients. 
Testing ones motivation may not be dependent on education. Comparing classroom 
skill training and combinations, higher educated individuals have a higher likelihood 
to participate in skill training courses. These are longer and more occupation spe-
cific and may require certain skills or education in advance. 
                                                
7  The entire results are not displayed but are available on request. 
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It can be shown that also the employment and unemployment history matters. Un-
employed persons have a lower probability to participate in classroom combinations 
in Eastern Germany, classroom aptitude tests as well as classroom work tests if 
they spent longer periods in regular employment during the last five years. Being 
out-of-labour-force for a longer period of time decreases the participation probability 
in classroom application and skill training, especially for men. Therefore, mostly 
long-term unemployed are especially targeted with several sub-programmes. This 
can be also confirmed by the fact that unemployed who have already participated in 
ALMPs have a higher probability to take part in short-term training. Especially former 
short-term training participation increases the probability for a new training participa-
tion. However, this does not hold for classroom application training. 
Furthermore, household characteristics matter for the selection probability. Western 
German single women have a higher propensity to take part in classroom aptitude 
tests and within-company training. Western German singles join application training 
more likely. However, Eastern German single men have a lower likelihood to partici-
pate in within-company skill training and combinations. Moreover, partner character-
istics are relevant for the programme selection. Individuals whose partner has a low 
or no education have a higher likelihood to take part in classroom combinations. On 
the contrary, unemployed with a skilled partner participate more likely in within-
company and classroom aptitude tests. 
This shows that different variables are important for the selection into different short-
term training programmes. Conditioning on these variables is therefore important for 
the analysis. 
Treatment effects: sub-programmes versus waiting 
The average treatment effects on the treated individuals on their employment prob-
ability are presented in Figures 8 to 14 (sub-programme versus waiting) in percent-
age points with 95 percent confidence bands. Figure 15 to 21 show the effects on 
the probability to participate in any ALMP. Table 5 displays the effects on employ-
ment stability. 
Classroom training programmes 
Classroom application training should improve the application and search process in 
order to integrate the unemployed into the labour market. There are negative effects 
for all four groups, which are longest for Eastern German men with up to one year. 
That means that there is not only a locking-in effect during the programme participa-
tion as application training only lasts up to two weeks but an extended catch-up pe-
riod. It can be shown that application training participants have a higher probability 
to participate in other programmes than non-participants (Figure 15)8. This shows 
                                                
8  The effects on the "any ALMP" outcome are shown from the third month after programme 
start onwards as the participants are participating in short-term training for a maximum 
duration of twelve weeks. Showing this share would increase the scale tremendously. 
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that application training is used as a stepping stone or preparation for other activi-
ties. After three to five months the negative effects disappear in Western Germany 
and for Eastern German women and stay insignificant (Figure 8). There are even 
small negative effects concerning the employment stability for East German men 
(Table 5). Participants in application training have a three percentage points lower 
probability to be at least six or twelve months in the first regular job than comparable 
non-participants.  
Work tests are not primarily designed to enhance skills in order to enable the inte-
gration into the labour market. They are used in order to test ones readiness and 
motivation to work. As one rather expects ex ante effects of this programme type, 
the ex post effects are not expected to be significant. The results show that the ini-
tial negative effects are only slightly longer than the actual programme duration as 
work tests are supposed to last no longer than two weeks.9 This is a surprising re-
sult if one compares the estimated effects of the work test with those of application 
training. Both programmes are quite similar in contents while the latter is especially 
designed to test ones readiness to work while application training should also en-
hance ones search process. The results even become significantly positive for men 
in Western Germany (with three to five percentage points) after 18 months (Figure 
9). The same holds also even for the minimum duration of six months of the first 
regular job (Table 5). 
Classroom aptitude tests last up to four weeks and should test ones aptitudes for a 
certain occupation or a programme. The initial negative effects are shorter in East-
ern than in Western Germany and last up to five months (Figure 10). Therefore, one 
gets the impression that aptitude tests are not used too often to prepare the partici-
pants for another programme, e.g., for longer training. This cannot be shown with 
the effects on the outcome "any ALMP" as there are positive effects also for this 
outcome (Figure 17). However, the effects decline after six months and quickly be-
come insignificant in Eastern Germany. The employment effects become positive for 
three groups and lie between two and four percentage points. The effects for West-
ern German women are not significant and the effects for Eastern German men turn 
insignificant at the end of the observation window (Figure 10). A positive effect can 
be also shown for employment stability for these three groups (Table 5). 
Classroom skill training courses have locking-in effects up to two months in Eastern 
Germany. These courses are supposed to have a maximum duration of eight 
weeks. In Western Germany, the initial negative effects exceed locking-in effects 
during the participation with up to five months. Thereafter, the effects turn to be sig-
nificantly positive with two to five percentage points for all four groups. Such an ef-
fect has been expected as skill training can theoretically lead to an employment ef-
                                                
9  The planned programme duration cannot be shown as this variable is incorrectly coded 
for the majority of cases. The compulsory maximum durations for each sub-programme 
are explained in the institutional setting. 
fect through more than one channel, e.g., human capital improvement, certain cer-
tificates or provision of information (Figure 11). As the employment effects are con-
sistently positive it is interesting to understand if the same holds for employment 
stability. There are small positive effects for the for the probability of being employed 
six or twelve months in the first regular job for Eastern Germans as well as for 
Western German men. 
The longest analysed classroom training programme is the one of classroom combi-
nation that may last up to twelve weeks. The initial negative effect in Eastern Ger-
many lasts exactly this maximum duration while it is longer in Western Germany. 
From the 18th month onwards, the effects become significantly positive for Western 
German men with two percentage points. On the contrary, there are no significant 
effects for Eastern German men and Western German women. The effects for East-
ern German women are only positive from the sixth to the 13th month and at the end 
of the observation window (Figure 12). Since often aptitude tests and skill training 
courses are combined in classroom combinations such effects have not been ex-
pected as skill training itself has positive effects. Possibly, the participants differ in 
these sub-programmes. Effects on the job stability can only be shown for Eastern 
German women (Table 5). 
Table 6 shows the different employment rates of sub-programme participants and 
the waiting group. It is noticeable that the employment rates for participants in 
Western Germany are higher than in Eastern Germany with around 20 up to almost 
30 percent. The male employment rates are generally higher than the female em-
ployment rates. 
Within-company training programmes 
Contrary to the classroom short-term training programmes, both within-company 
training measures have substantial positive effects. The results are shown in Figure 
13 and 14. There is only a very short locking-in period during programme participa-
tion that is directly followed by significantly positive effects of 13 up to 20 percentage 
points. The reason for this high effect can be the direct contact to a potential em-
ployer of the participants in such internships. Moreover, participants learn firm-
specific human capital additional to general human capital or sector specific human 
capital. Therefore, it is also beneficial for the employer to appoint the participant 
afterwards. The effects on the probability of participating in any ALMP are insignifi-
cant (Figures 20 and 21). However, these results could also point to the existence of 
deadweight losses. This cannot be clarified in this study with these datasets. 
Moreover, it is noticeable that the effects of both programme types are quite similar. 
However, skill training and combinations have much larger confidence intervals than 
aptitude tests. Moreover, the effects for women are slightly higher for within-
company aptitude tests than for the other programme type. 
Having such large positive employment effects it is important to look at an outcome 
variable describing the employment stability (Table 5). The results show that the 
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probability of having a stable job (six or twelve months) is increased considerably 
(13 to 24 percentage points). This confirms the effectiveness of this instrument not 
only to be a stepping stone for employment in general but to be a stepping stone to 
more stable employment. 
Treatment effects: pair-wise comparisons 
In the following, I present the key results of the pair-wise comparisons.10 These are 
selected according to the following criteria: First, I show the results of classroom 
application training as one typical example of a short-term training programme com-
pared to the other classroom training programmes. Application training courses rep-
resent one sub-programme that is closest to the international job search assistance. 
Second, I show the results for classroom skill training compared to other classroom 
training programmes as this is the sub-programme in classrooms with the most con-
sistent positive treatment effects compared to the waiting group. Moreover, it is one 
of the largest sub-programmes. Moreover, both sub-programmes are relatively large 
and therefore important short-term training programmes. Third, I compare both 
within-company training programmes directly to each other. The results are dis-
played in Figure 22 to 31. 
Classroom Application training versus other classroom training programmes 
Comparing classroom application training directly to other classroom training pro-
grammes, they have either negative or no effects. There are hardly any significant 
effects when comparing application training and work tests (Figure 22). There are 
sporadic small negative effects for Eastern German men. This result is astonishing 
because application training should enhance the search efficiency. However, both 
programmes are quite similar in their contents. Comparing application training and 
aptitude tests, there are small negative effects in Eastern Germany and no effects in 
Western Germany (Figure 23). The pair-wise comparison to skill training yields 
mostly negative effects (Figure 24). However, there are nearly no effects for West-
ern German women. They would not have had any advantages if they had partici-
pated in skill training instead of application training. The results are quite similar 
comparing application training and combinations (Figure 25). There are mostly 
negative effects in Eastern Germany and no effects in Western Germany. 
Therefore, application training has no positive effects neither compared to non-
participation nor to participation in other sub-programmes. That means that the par-
ticipants of application training would also not have been better off if they had taken 
part in another programme in some of the cases. 
Classroom skill training versus other classroom training programmes 
On the contrary, comparing classroom skill training courses to other classroom train-
ing programmes, the effects are either positive or zero. Only for women in Eastern 
Germany, there are positive effects from three to five percentage points from the 
                                                
10  All pair-wise comparisons have been estimated and are available on request. 
sixth months onwards for the pair-wise comparison between skill training and work 
tests (Figure 26). This is astonishing, as one would have expected clear positive 
effects for all four groups as there are several channels in skill training that would 
lead to an employment effect on the contrary to work tests. There are mostly posi-
tive effects of skill training compared to application training for men as expected 
(Figure 27). However, only a few of the estimated effects are significant for women. 
Comparing skill training to aptitude tests or combinations there are no effects of skill 
training (Figure 28 and 29). The only exceptions are Western German women com-
pared to combinations at the end of the observation window, where the effect gets 
positive. 
Therefore, in contrast to the comparison to the non-participation case, classroom 
skill training courses are not always beneficial compared to other sub-programme 
participations. That means that participating in skill training is better for the partici-
pants than waiting; however it is not better for them than participating in aptitude 
tests or combinations. 
Comparing two types of within-company training 
There are hardly any differences for both types of within-company training compar-
ing them to the non-participation group. What are the results comparing both types 
directly to each other? There are also hardly any effects when comparing within-
company aptitude tests and within-company skill training or combinations and vice 
versa (Figure 30 and 31). There are only a few exceptions. Aptitude tests are bene-
ficial in the short run compared to skill training/combinations for Western German 
women. One reason could be the shorter duration of aptitude tests. Moreover, skill 
training/combinations show some sporadic negative effects for Eastern German 
women compared to aptitude tests. However, one has to take into account that most 
within-company training programmes are aptitude tests. There are merely no differ-
ences in the effects and a slight advantage of aptitude tests compared to skill train-
ings or combinations. 
8 Conclusions 
This study investigates the different performance of seven sub-programmes of 
short-term training relative to one another as well as compared to the non-
participation case. The analysed target group consists of German welfare benefit 
recipients. The period under review is the time period directly after a reform of the 
German means-tested benefit system in January 2005, which aims at activating 
benefit recipients in needy households. 
I estimated the treatment effects for short-term training inflow samples from Febru-
ary to April 2005. The non-participation or waiting group stems from the unemploy-
ment stock receiving welfare benefit UB II. The samples are drawn from large and 
rich administrative data sets. I am able to include a large set of characteristics that 
are likely to affect on the one hand the sub-programme participation decision and on 
the other hand the outcomes. 
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The results suggest that only some sub-programmes yield positive employment ef-
fects when participation is compared to waiting. This is an important finding given 
that other authors find generally positive effects of short-term training not distin-
guishing between different types (Biewen et al. 2007; Hujer et al. 2006) or they find 
positive effects of classroom training in general while not differentiating between 
various classroom training types (Stephan 2008; Stephan/Pahnke 2008; Wolff/  
Jozwiak 2007). 
The general positive effect of short-term training appears to be driven by the large 
consistent effect of aptitude tests and skill trainings or combinations within compa-
nies. Both within-firm trainings have employment effects up to 20 percentage points 
and increase employment stability. That means that within-company training in gen-
eral is beneficial compared to non-participation. Nevertheless, these positive effects 
could also reflect deadweight losses as firms may be involved in the selection proc-
ess and job centres could have provided them with trainees who the firms would 
have employed anyway. On the other hand, the improved employment stability hints 
to the point that the prolonged screening process through the programme installs a 
more stable employer-employee match than without such an internship. Therefore, it 
stays an open question if there are deadweight losses of within-firm training or not. 
The positive effect of short-term classroom training seems to be mostly driven by the 
consistent positive effect of skill training courses. Also aptitude tests and classroom 
combinations have positive employment effects for some groups. These courses are 
more occupation specific than, e.g., application training and potentially effective 
through several channels, such as human capital improvement, certain certificates 
or the provision of information. 
The employment effects of application training and work tests are less promising 
compared to international studies that mostly find positive employment effects of job 
search assistance. One explanation could be that most international job search as-
sistance programmes are individually oriented mentoring programmes. Therefore, 
they may be more intensive which could lead to the positive effects (van den Berg/ 
van der Klaauw 2006). Moreover, such more intense programmes may be used for 
different target groups and less for the work test purpose. However, a new law that 
has been implemented in January 2009 in Germany actually goes partly in this di-
rection emphasising programme flexibility and also individually oriented counselling. 
Moreover, this study cannot reveal if such sub-programmes work as a work test. 
This will be a future task where different data are needed. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that parts of such a short programme cause positive 
employment effects for welfare recipients and long-term unemployed, who are a 
specific group that has not worked for a long time period and should have extreme 
difficulties of getting jobs. Therefore, the short-term training is a short and relatively 
inexpensive programme that does not harm participants and even facilitates 
chances to get a stable job, at least for some, mostly occupation specific, sub-
programmes. 
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Comparing sub-programmes directly to each other, the results differ from those in 
the comparison with the non-participating group. Comparing classroom application 
training to other classroom short-term training programmes, there are no groups that 
have benefited from application training. Participants in Eastern Germany would 
have been clearly better off (with up to five percentage points) if they had partici-
pated in aptitude tests, skill training or combinations. This also partly holds for 
Western German men. Thus, treating some of the application training participants by 
one of these alternatives would improve the effectiveness of short-term training. 
While classroom skill training courses are clearly favoured compared to non-
participation, the effects are not the same in contrast to participation in other class-
room training programmes. They are either positive or zero. Therefore, it would not 
be better to reallocate classroom skill training participants to any of the other pro-
grammes. None of the other comparisons between sub-programmes provide sub-
stantial evidence that a shift of participants from one programme type to another 
implies major changes in the effectiveness of short-term training. These results do 
not imply other effects such as macro effects. 
The results are only partly consistent with the international literature. Internationally, 
training is mostly beneficial for the re-employment chances. However, such results 
are mostly only shown for a different group of unemployed, the UI recipients. This 
study shows comparable positive effects for within-company trainings, classroom 
skill training courses and partly for aptitude tests and combinations even being 
shorter than most programmes in other countries. On the contrary, many interna-
tional studies also find positive effects of job search assistance while I do not find 
such positive effects for application training. However, these programmes and the 
participants are not entirely comparable. The application training programme which 
is analysed in this study does not mainly consist of individual job search assistance 
but mainly of courses that are held for groups. Moreover, JSA is mainly analysed for 
UI recipients in the international context. This also makes results even less compa-
rable. However, a new law has been introduced in January 2009 in Germany where 
job search assistance is designed to be more individually oriented than before. Fu-
ture research will have to evaluate the more individual JSA and also compare indi-
vidual JSA and application training courses directly with each other to shed some 
more light in the working and effects of these programmes for welfare recipients. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Sample sizes 
Men Women Men Women Overall
Classroom training
Application training 835 782 2,078 1,660 5,355
Work tests 739 674 1,784 1,137 4,334
Aptitude tests 3,505 2,868 3,640 2,142 12,155
Skill training courses 2,554 2,310 3,823 2,916 11,603
Combinations 2,545 2,036 4,668 2,952 12,201
Within-company training
Aptitude tests 3,943 2,507 6,048 2,243 14,741
Skill training/combinations 990 703 2,752 1,157 5,602
Overall 15,111 11,880 24,793 14,207 65,991
Waiting group 82,162 69,214 145,011 106,384 402,771
Eastern Germany Western Germany
 
 
 
Table 2 
Probit estimates for Western German men in within-company aptitude tests 
(robust standard errors in parantheses) 
Coefficient
Age in years
25-29 -0.122 (0.024)
30-34 -0.167 (0.026)
35-39 -0.230 (0.026)
40-44 -0.322 (0.027)
45-57 -0.461 (0.026)
Foreigners or German w ith migration background -0.061 (0.017)
Partner and children
no partner -0.029 (0.034)
One child 0.028 (0.022)
Tw o and more children 0.004 (0.021)
Education
Secondary school, vocational education 0.133 (0.016)
GCSE, no vocational education 0.067 (0.029)
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.168 (0.020)  
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Table 2 continued 
Probit estimates for Western German men in within-company aptitude tests 
(robust standard errors in parantheses) 
Coefficient
Unemployment history
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2004 to 01/2005:
7 to 9 months 0.020 (0.023)
10 to 12 months -0.048 (0.023)
Cumulated duration of unempl., 02/2000 to 01/2005:
1 to 6 months 0.073 (0.034)
7 to 18 months -0.031 (0.034)
19 to 24 months -0.079 (0.039)
25 to 48 months -0.169 (0.041)
Cum. dur. of UI receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2005:
1 to 12 months 0.133 (0.027)
> 12 months 0.163 (0.031)
Cum. dur. of UA receipt from 02/2000 to 01/2005:
1 to 12 months 0.049 (0.034)
13 to 24 months -0.016 (0.038)
25 to 60 months -0.061 (0.043)
UI receipt yes, 31st December 2004 0.156 (0.036)
UA receipt yes, 31st December 2005 0.090 (0.028)
Employment history
Cumulated dur. of regular employment 01/2000 to 12/2004:
1 to 6 months 0.057 (0.044)
7 to 12 months 0.038 (0.045)
13 to 18 months 0.035 (0.044)
19 to 30 months 0.059 (0.045)
31 to 60 months 0.084 (0.048)
ALMP history
Time since end of last ALMP:
One 0.151 (0.023)
Tw o 0.097 (0.024)
Three 0.034 (0.025)
Number of ALMPs  in last f ive years:
One 0.014 (0.023)
Tw o or three 0.096 (0.025)
Four and more 0.158 (0.031)  
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Table 2 continued 
Probit estimates for Western German men in within-company aptitude tests 
(robust standard errors in parantheses) 
Coefficient
Information on the last regular job
White-collar w orker 0.012 (0.023)
part-time -0.088 (0.029)
No job yet 0.050 (0.063)
Last regular monthly real w age (deflated w ith CPI, 2000=100):
>500 to 1000 Euro 0.017 (0.029)
>1000 to 1500 Euro 0.047 (0.027)
>1500 0.079 (0.026)
Time since end of last contributory job:
1 to 6 months 0.254 (0.037)
7 to 12 months 0.189 (0.038)
13 to 24 months 0.143 (0.035)
25 to 48 months 0.079 (0.033)
Average duration of contributory jobs betw een 01/2000 and 12/2004:
7 to 12 months -0.076 (0.020)
13 to 24 months -0.113 (0.024)
25 to 60 months -0.243 (0.034)
missing 0.009 (0.063)
Partner variables
Partner's cum. dur. neither empl. nor job-seeker nor unemployment 
benefit receipt (proxy for out-of-labour force), 01/2000 to 12/2004
13 to 30 months -0.061 (0.028)
Partner's regular employment, 02/2000 to 01/2005:
13 to 60 months 0.031 (0.026)
Partner education:
Secondary school, vocational education 0.071 (0.031)
GCSE or A-levels, vocational education or college 0.040 (0.025)
missing partner id 0.087 (0.032)
Regional variables
Local unempl. rate in January 2005 0.011 (0.003)
%age change in local unempl. rate in January 2005 0.003 (0.001)
Percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 -0.005 (0.002)
total %age change of percentage of LTU in Jan. 2005 0.006 (0.001)
Vacancy-unemployment ratio  in January 2005 -0.885 (0.277)
Cities in West Germany w ith average labour market conditions -0.173 (0.034)
Cities in West Germany w ith above-average labour market conditions 0.127 (0.039)
Urban areas w ith average labour market cond. 0.155 (0.025)
Rural areas w ith average/below  avereage LM conditions 0.265 (0.027)
Rural areas w ith above average/very favourite LM conditions 0.177 (0.040)
Rural areas in W. G., very favourite LM cond. and low  LTU 0.210 (0.039)
missing sector -0.152 (0.052)
Trade, transport, communication 0.015 (0.019)
Services for companies -0.068 (0.020)
Other services -0.097 (0.023)
Constant -2.703
Number of observations 115742
Pseudo R² 0.0869  
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Table 3 
Matching Quality for participating versus waiting 
sub-programme group MSB before MSB af ter R² before R² af ter
Treated on 
support
Controls on 
support
Treated of f  
support
% of f  
support
classroom 1: Men, East Germany 13.90 2.19 0.0664 0.0040 636 70689 0 0%
application training 2: Women, East Germany 9.61 1.29 0.0434 0.0014 633 59670 0 0%
3: Men, West Germany 9.76 0.91 0.0672 0.0010 1442 117130 0 0%
4: Women, West Germany 7.89 0.71 0.0471 0.0006 1118 81218 0 0%
classroom 1: Men, East Germany 12.54 2.00 0.0584 0.0027 596 70689 0 0%
w ork tests 2: Women, East Germany 9.73 1.64 0.0456 0.0018 556 59670 0 0%
3: Men, West Germany 12.49 1.45 0.0509 0.0026 1214 117130 0 0%
4: Women, West Germany 7.44 1.34 0.0309 0.0024 747 81218 0 0%
classroom 1: Men, East Germany 11.18 0.38 0.1088 0.0004 2684 70689 1 0%
aptitude tests 2: Women, East Germany 8.89 0.32 0.0825 0.0003 2296 59670 3 0%
3: Men, West Germany 11.25 0.70 0.0846 0.0024 2524 117130 5 0%
4: Women, West Germany 9.47 0.78 0.0607 0.0020 1505 81218 3 0%
classroom 1: Men, East Germany 8.70 0.42 0.0603 0.0003 1967 70689 0 0%
skill training 2: Women, East Germany 9.08 0.25 0.0601 0.0001 1813 59670 2 0%
3: Men, West Germany 7.87 0.27 0.0562 0.0002 2639 117130 0 0%
4: Women, West Germany 9.60 0.36 0.0594 0.0005 1962 81218 0 0%
classroom 1: Men, East Germany 12.08 0.36 0.0892 0.0003 2044 70689 1 0%
combination 2: Women, East Germany 8.76 0.31 0.0708 0.0003 1640 59670 0 0%
3: Men, West Germany 12.05 0.31 0.1035 0.0012 3327 117130 0 0%
4: Women, West Germany 12.15 0.57 0.0855 0.0028 1950 81218 4 0%
w ithin-company 1: Men, East Germany 14.58 0.32 0.1324 0.0002 2713 70689 6 0%
aptitude tests 2: Women, East Germany 14.05 0.42 0.1323 0.0003 1776 59670 4 0%
3: Men, West Germany 13.13 0.26 0.1128 0.0001 3856 117130 3 0%
4: Women, West Germany 17.27 0.54 0.1389 0.0006 1394 81218 1 0%
w ithin-company 1: Men, East Germany 17.76 1.62 0.0877 0.0018 673 70689 0 0%
skill training/combination 2: Women, East Germany 20.21 2.07 0.0912 0.0027 479 59670 0 0%
3: Men, West Germany 17.92 0.73 0.0851 0.0004 1814 117130 0 0%
4: Women, West Germany 22.77 1.49 0.1046 0.0015 761 81218 0 0%  
 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 17/2009 36 
37 IAB-Discussion Paper 17/2009 
sub-programmes group MSB before MSB af ter R² before R² af ter
Treated on 
support
Controls on 
support
Treated of f  
support
% of f  
support matching algorithm
Classroom w ithin group comparison
skill training 1: Men, East Germany 8.33 1.92 0.0395 0.0041 1885 2045 82 4% radius matching, caliper 0.001
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.27 2.07 0.0477 0.0041 1803 1640 12 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
combination 3: Men, West Germany 10.49 2.02 0.0742 0.0027 2617 3327 22 1% radius matching, caliper 0.001
4: Women, West Germany 9.05 2.22 0.0629 0.0055 1961 1954 1 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
skill training 1: Men, East Germany 7.19 1.71 0.0347 0.0029 1924 2685 43 2% radius matching, caliper 0.001
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.82 1.91 0.0558 0.0025 1749 2299 66 4% radius matching, caliper 0.001
aptitude tests 3: Men, West Germany 8.92 1.30 0.0421 0.0018 2601 2529 38 1% radius matching, caliper 0.001
4: Women, West Germany 15.23 2.41 0.0696 0.0057 1948 1508 14 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
skill training 1: Men, East Germany 9.43 2.49 0.0484 0.0078 1944 596 23 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.29 2.07 0.0289 0.0023 1811 556 4 0% radius matching, caliper 0.05
w ork tests 3: Men, West Germany 6.97 1.26 0.0195 0.0008 2612 1214 27 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
4: Women, West Germany 13.77 2.32 0.0503 0.0031 1804 747 158 8% radius matching, caliper 0.001
skill training 1: Men, East Germany 13.45 2.37 0.0664 0.0050 1940 636 27 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 11.23 2.25 0.0606 0.0036 1775 633 40 2% radius matching, caliper 0.005
application training 3: Men, West Germany 8.54 1.91 0.0303 0.0025 2437 1442 202 8% radius matching, caliper 0.0005
4: Women, West Germany 11.77 2.33 0.0734 0.0055 1792 1118 170 9% radius matching, caliper 0.001
application training 1: Men, East Germany 8.01 2.33 0.0436 0.0040 623 2045 13 2% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 6.35 1.55 0.0379 0.0030 630 1640 3 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
combination 3: Men, West Germany 11.04 1.63 0.0582 0.0017 1314 3327 128 9% radius matching, caliper 0.0005
4: Women, West Germany 14.83 2.46 0.1024 0.0067 1109 1954 9 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
application training 1: Men, East Germany 9.96 2.09 0.0613 0.0031 635 2685 1 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 8.17 1.22 0.0466 0.0027 629 2299 4 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
aptitude tests 3: Men, West Germany 12.47 1.27 0.0904 0.0020 1359 2529 83 6% radius matching, caliper 0.001
4: Women, West Germany 10.40 2.75 0.0325 0.0019 1114 1508 4 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
application training 1: Men, East Germany 11.68 2.62 0.0603 0.0068 628 1967 8 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 11.23 2.03 0.0606 0.0030 622 1815 11 2% radius matching, caliper 0.005
skill training 3: Men, West Germany 10.81 1.92 0.0875 0.0039 1436 2639 6 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
4: Women, West Germany 11.77 1.48 0.0734 0.0029 1109 1962 9 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
application training 1: Men, East Germany 6.63 2.16 0.0430 0.0043 627 596 9 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.26 2.87 0.0495 0.0044 614 556 19 3% radius matching, caliper 0.005
w ork tests 3: Men, West Germany 7.97 1.49 0.0307 0.0011 1438 1214 4 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
4: Women, West Germany 8.42 1.65 0.0286 0.0020 1107 747 11 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
Within-company w ithin group comparison
aptitude tests 1: Men, East Germany 9.60 2.72 0.0677 0.0085 2263 673 456 17% radius matching, caliper 0.0005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.12 3.41 0.0777 0.0109 1529 479 251 14% radius matching, caliper 0.001
skill training/combination 3: Men, West Germany 4.68 0.79 0.0214 0.0006 3854 1814 5 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
4: Women, West Germany 5.24 1.49 0.0249 0.0034 1392 761 3 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
skill training/combination 1: Men, East Germany 9.60 1.45 0.0677 0.0031 671 2719 2 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
vs. 2: Women, East Germany 9.12 3.13 0.0777 0.0073 474 1780 5 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005
aptitude tests 3: Men, West Germany 4.68 0.60 0.0214 0.0003 1805 3859 9 0% radius matching, caliper 0.005
4: Women, West Germany 5.24 1.03 0.0249 0.0016 755 1395 6 1% radius matching, caliper 0.005  
Table 4 
Matching Quality for the pair-wise comparisons 
 
Table 5 
Effects on employment stability  
Outcome Men East Women East Men West Women West
classroom application training versus waiting
at least 6 months employed -0.03 *** -0.01 0.00 0.00
at least 12 months employed -0.03 *** -0.01 0.00 0.00
classroom work test versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.00 0.00 0.02 * 0.02
at least 12 months employed 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
classroom aptitude test versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.02 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 ** -0.01
at least 12 months employed 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 * -0.01
classroom skill training versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.02 ** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01
at least 12 months employed 0.01 * 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01
classroom combination versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.01 0.03 *** 0.00 0.00
at least 12 months employed 0.00 0.01 * 0.00 0.00
within-company aptitude test versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.17 *** 0.24 *** 0.17 *** 0.18 ***
at least 12 months employed 0.14 *** 0.19 *** 0.13 *** 0.16 ***
within-company skill training/combination versus waiting
at least 6 months employed 0.19 *** 0.22 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 ***
at least 12 months employed 0.15 *** 0.17 *** 0.13 *** 0.15 ***
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Table 6 
Employment rates (regular unsubsidised employment) for treated and controls (participation versus waiting) 
classroom: Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
application 12 months unmatched 7.1 9.0 7.9 8.4 12.6 11.7 11.4 12.6
training ATT 7.1 10.1 7.9 9.3 12.6 13.0 11.4 12.9
24 months unmatched 15.4 14.4 12.2 11.7 20.1 17.9 17.5 16.2
ATT 15.4 15.9 12.2 13.1 20.1 20.2 17.5 17.2
w ork 12 months unmatched 11.4 9.0 7.9 8.4 15.8 11.7 15.4 12.5
test ATT 11.4 9.9 7.9 8.8 15.8 14.2 15.4 13.6
24 months unmatched 16.1 14.4 13.7 11.7 25.9 17.9 19.5 16.2
ATT 16.1 15.9 13.7 12.2 25.9 22.1 19.5 17.5
aptitude 12 months unmatched 13.7 9.0 8.4 5.3 17.4 11.7 14.1 12.6
test ATT 13.7 11.6 10.7 3.0 17.4 15.9 13.9 14.4
24 months unmatched 21.6 14.3 11.6 6.1 27.1 17.9 20.6 16.2
ATT 21.6 19.2 14.8 2.8 27.1 24.9 20.5 18.9
skill 12 months unmatched 13.0 9.0 13.4 8.5 17.8 11.7 15.7 12.6
training ATT 13.0 11.0 13.5 11.1 17.8 15.5 15.7 15.4
24 months unmatched 21.5 14.4 19.3 11.7 28.5 17.9 23.6 16.2
ATT 21.5 18.1 19.2 15.8 28.5 23.8 23.6 20.6
combination 12 months unmatched 11.7 9.0 13.0 8.5 17.7 11.7 16.5 12.6
ATT 11.7 11.0 13.0 10.4 17.7 17.2 16.5 16.0
24 months unmatched 18.0 14.4 16.8 11.7 29.1 17.9 22.6 16.2
ATT 18.0 18.3 16.8 14.8 29.1 26.5 22.6 21.4
w ithin-firm: 12 months unmatched 32.5 9.0 38.4 8.4 36.7 11.7 39.6 12.5
aptitude ATT 32.5 15.1 38.5 14.9 36.7 19.5 39.6 20.7
test 24 months unmatched 42.3 14.4 41.1 11.7 45.9 18.0 42.5 16.2
ATT 42.4 25.6 41.1 20.5 45.9 29.7 42.5 27.1
skill 12 months unmatched 34.6 9.0 33.6 8.4 35.9 11.7 35.1 12.6
training/ ATT 34.6 14.2 33.6 13.8 35.9 18.6 35.1 19.7
combination 24 months unmatched 43.4 14.3 38.2 11.7 44.8 17.9 40.9 16.2
ATT 43.4 23.0 38.2 19.1 44.8 27.8 40.9 25.5
Men East Women East Men West Women West
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Figure 1: Propensity score distribution of classroom Figure 2: Propensity score distribution of classroom 
 application training vs. waiting  work test vs. waiting 
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Figure 3: Propensity score distribution of classroom Figure 4: Propensity score distribution of classroom skill 
 aptitude test vs. waiting  training vs. waiting 
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Figure 5: Propensity score distribution of classroom Figure 6: Propensity score distribution of within company 
 combination vs. waiting  aptitude test vs. waiting 
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Figure 7: Propensity score distribution of within company 
 skill training/combination vs. waiting 
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Figure 8: ATTs for classroom application training (radius Figure 9: ATTs for classroom work tests (radius matching, 
 matching, caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment  caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment 
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Figure 10: ATTs for classroom aptitude tests (radius matching, Figure 11: ATTs for classroom skill training (radius matching, 
 caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment  caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment 
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Figure 12: ATTs for classroom combinations (radius match- Figure 13: ATTs for within-company aptitude tests (radius 
 ing, caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment  matching, caliper 0.001), outcome regular employ- 
   ment 
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Figure 14: ATTs for within-company skill training and combinations  
 (radius matching, caliper 0.001), outcome regular employment 
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Figure 15: ATTs for classroom application training, outcome Figure 16: ATTs for classroom work test, outcome any ALMP 
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Figure 17: ATTs for classroom aptitude test, outcome any Figure 18: ATTs for classroom skill training, outcome any 
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Figure 19: ATTs for classroom combination, outcome any Figure 20: ATTs for within company aptitude test, outcome 
 ALMP  any ALMP 
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Figure 21: ATTs for within company skill training/  
 combination, outcome any ALMP 
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Figure 22: ATTs for classroom application training vs. class- Figure 23: ATTs for classroom application training vs. class- 
 room work test, outcome regular employment  room aptitude test, outcome regular employment 
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Figure 24: ATTs for classroom application training vs. class- Figure 25: ATTs for classroom application training vs. class- 
 room skill training, outcome regular employment  room combination, outcome regular employment 
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Figure 26: ATTs for classroom skill training vs. classroom Figure 27: ATTs for classroom skill training vs. classroom 
 work test, outcome regular employment  application training, outcome regular employment 
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Figure 28: ATTs for classroom skill training vs. classroom Figure 29: ATTs for classroom skill training vs. classroom 
 aptitude tests, outcome regular employment  combination, outcome regular employment 
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Figure 30: ATTs for within-company aptitude tests vs. Figure 31: ATTs for within-company skill  
within-company skill training/company aptitude -  training/combination vs. within-combination,  
tests, outcome regular employment  outcome regular employment 
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